Mine-risk Education and the Amateur
Scrap-metal Hunter
In many countries where landmines
and unexploded ordnance threaten
populations, people ignore warnings
about these hazardous explosives
to collect explosive remnants of war
for the valuable scrap metal they
contain. The author discusses a program proposed by the Golden West
Humanitarian Foundation to manage
this dangerous practice.
by Allan R. Vosburgh [ Golden West Humanitarian
Foundation ]

M

uch money, time and effort have been invested in conventional mine-risk education.
UNICEF defines mine-risk education as “a
process that promotes the adoption of safer behaviors by
at-risk groups and links affected communities and other
mine-action components.”1 The problem is this “process”
doesn’t always work as well as we hope. The Cambodian
Mine/UXO Victim Information System reports that in
August 2006, 35 new landmine/UXO victims were recorded in Cambodia.2 Out of these 35 casualties only one
victim had not previously received MRE. 2 This data is
consistent with previous reports as well.3 That means 97
percent of victims had received some sort of conventional
MRE prior to being killed or injured by landmines or
unexploded munitions. If 97 percent of drivers involved
in crashes had recently completed drivers’ training, we
might begin to question the overall effectiveness of that
training. In Southeast Asia, despite some reductions in
casualties overall, the fastest growing at-risk groups are
those involved in scrap-metal collection.
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These numbers certainly do not mean we should abandon efforts to educate the
population about avoiding death and injury from mines and UXO. On the contrary,
what it may suggest is new ideas are needed to address specific types of hazards and
categories of potential victims, particularly amateur scrap-metal collectors.
According to reports by the Cambodian Mine/UXO Victim Information
System, 353 people were injured or killed between January and August 2006 in
Cambodia.2 Of these casualties, 62 percent were men, 8 percent were women,
and 30 percent were children under 18 years of age.2 Fifty-eight percent of the
casualties were people injured or killed by UXO and 42 percent by landmines.2
These numbers indicate a disturbing trend in which casualties are increasing despite greater efforts to eliminate threats. This trend also exists in Vietnam, Laos
and other areas. We think it points to an underlying problem—collecting scrap
metal is the new growth industry in these countries.
The Golden West Humanitarian Foundation has taken a pragmatic aproach to
MRE, generalizing it to become ERW threat-indicators education.4 We strongly
support education but believe the best way to prevent deaths and injuries is to use
education as one element in a program designed to eliminate the ERW threats as
quickly as possible.
Sneaky Devices
In central Vietnam and Laos, many deaths or injuries are caused in particular by unexploded cluster submunitions or 40-mm grenades. These unstable,
long-lasting munitions are a widespread hazard, frequently concealed by tall grass
or shallow dirt. Not only are they hit by farmers’ hoes or plows, exploded when
fires are built on top of them and irresistable to children, but these dangerous
munitions are often the very devices scrap-metal collectors intentionally gather,
disarm and sell.
In addition, unexploded mortar projectiles can be a threat. Mortar projectiles come in a huge variety of sizes and contain a number of different fillers. In
Vietnam, mortars can be found from 60-mm to 160-mm. Fillers may include
different types of high explosives, white phosphorus and other smokes and flares.
Fuzes may incorporate proximity devices, or use impact, powder-train or timing
mechanisms for initiation. Unfortunately, once the paint and markings are weathered away, it is often very difficult to positively identify the type of filler and, therefore, the explosive threat. Mortars can be small, easy to move and less intimidating
than artillery projectiles and bombs. They can also be deadly.

These munitions, submunitions and
grenades share a single deceptive characteristic that can lull victims into a false sense
of security: inconsistency. They often fail to
fully arm and detonate due to a critical and
permanent mechanical fault in their arming or firing mechanism. However, at other
times, the fault may be minimal, allowing
arming but preventing firing. In these cases,
items of UXO may require only heat, shock
or friction to detonate—sometimes years
later. Firing mechanisms are complex and
designed to accept input from almost any
direction. Because these munitions are so
often damaged and prevented from functioning, people come to believe they are
harmless. When a civilian picks one up and
it doesn’t kill him or her, that person is more
likely to pick up the next one. However, the
next munition or the one after that may detonate without warning, killing or seriously
injuring both the person who picked it up
and anyone nearby.
Challenges to Conventional Mine-risk
Education Practices
So what might the problem be? Why
would anyone who has received training
pointing out the dangers of interacting
with munitions intentionally do it anyway?
Is there something about the training that
makes it ineffective? Are there other factors at work that overcome the warnings?
Are there ways to enhance the training to
make it more effective? The answers to
these questions are complex and there are
no easy solutions.5
Most programs engaged in MRE recognize that people are frequently injured by

dentally trigger explosions in the process of
their daily work, but those most resistant to
behavioral change are scrap-metal collectors.
Scrap-metal trading has become a wellentrenched part of many local economies
throughout Southeast Asia. Scrap-metal
collectors engage in their dangerous trade
for a variety of reasons, but most say they
simply need the money they earn from its
sale. Studies have shown people are generally well-aware of the dangers they face, but
feel compelled to continue the dangerous activity due to the pressures of poverty.6 They
often report feeling they have no choice.
The Solution
The apparent failure of various kinds
of education to change this risky behavior
signals a need for a change in our MRE approach. Perhaps instead of spending all our
energies trying to eliminate risky behavior,
we should be trying to find new ways to
make this inevitable behavior safer. This proposed approach will undoubtedly find many
opponents who feel we are simply encouraging more risky behavior; however, at Golden
West we believe in taking a pragmatic approach to behavior that we think will continue with or without our intervention.
Golden West believes we can successfully combine our experience with Explosive
Remnants of War Indicators Programs and
our popular Explosive Harvesting System
into a concept that addresses the growing
number of scrap-metal-related casualties.
Educating people and providing a more robust explosive ordnance disposal response
to ERW reports will hopefully encourage
the public to make more reports. Rather

to use training to eliminate threats from the
most dangerous items (primarily submunitions, grenades and mortars), there might be
ways to develop an exchange system for the
less hazardous ones.
A New Response to Scrapmetal Collection
In this concept, expanded explosive
ordnance-disposal teams respond to UXO
reports from civilians, assess the threat and
return harmless items to be sold as scrap.
For questionable items that cannot be safely
turned over, a fee equal to the weight of the
useable metal would be paid by the team to
the finder. These items would be transported
to a small explosives-processing facility for
treatment (when feasible) and the metal parts
sold to reimburse the program. UXO deemed
too dangerous for movement would be destroyed in place by the safest method possible.
Recovered items deemed unsuitable, too dangerous for processing or lost during treatment
would be considered a program cost.
A blow-in-place procedure for small items
(like individual submunitions or grenades)
can use field-expedient7 damage-mitigation
methods such as Mr. BIP.8 Larger items
may be controlled by ditching, sandbags or
water. Whenever possible, items will be
moved away from occupied areas prior to
any procedures being initiated.
Under this concept only simple rendersafe procedures will be applied; no complex
procedures will be attempted and absolutely
no procedures that include any degree of
risk to operators will be conducted. Safety
will never be compromised in the interest
of scrap metal. Only items the senior EOD

Status*

Action

Reimbursement

Disposition

No hazard: contains no explosive

None

None

Turn over to finder for sale

Extreme hazard: fuzed and contains
explosive (do not move)

Blow in place or move remotely and
BIP

Market price

Destroy on site

Dangerous: fuzed and contains high
explosive (transportation hazard)

Attempt render-safe procedures
(when feasible)

Market price

Treatment facility or BIP

Dangerous: no fuze and contains high
explosive (no transportation hazard)

Transport to safe holding area

Market price

Treatment facility
* As determined by EOD only.

Table 1: Examples of options for different threats.

UXO they knew was there. As the numbers from Cambodia show, successful completion of an MRE program is no assurance
one will not fall victim to a mine or item of
UXO. Many victims are children who play
with munitions or dangerous munitions
components (e.g., fuzes) near their homes or
schools. Farmers or woodcutters often acci-

than spend resources trying to discourage
behavior we know is happening, why not try
a new approach that may make the process a
little safer?
Furthermore, might we do even more in
an effort to reduce casualties and actually
establish training and procedures facilitating safer scrap collection? If there was a way

Team Leader considers safe to transport
will be moved off the site. These items will
then be independently inspected by EOD
personnel prior to being brought into any
safe holding area.
Reimbursements will be established as
a reward system for reporting and leaving
items undisturbed, and as a safe means for
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people to obtain needed money in exchange for suspect
items. There will no longer be an excuse that they had
no choice because we are providing a choice. People do
not need to endanger their families, neighbors or themselves to make a little extra money.
The senior EOD Team Leader will be provided with
small amounts of cash to do on-the-spot reimbursements
for dangerous items removed by the team. Scrap resulting from processing of munitions will be sold and any
profits reinvested in the program. Any recovered explosives will be used to support disposal of other unusable
munitions. There will be a strict system of accounting
for funds. The physical inventory of munitions in the
program’s safe holding area validates the expenditure
of funds. Despite the closed-loop character of the concept, there is no expectation that this will be a balanced
system; that is, the investments will never equal the
profits from sale of metal.
A munitions-treatment facility should be located in a
remote area with plenty of buffer zone in all directions.
Barricades will be field-expedient: locally produced and
using rubber tires filled with sand or sand-filled concrete pipes; no permanent facilities will be constructed.
Disposal tools will be remotely operated and procedures
monitored via closed-circuit TV. With some modification, many of the tools and procedures used by the Golden
West Explosives Harvesting System may be appropriate
for use in the demilitarization facility. When fuzes cannot be safely removed, projectiles can be cut behind the

booster or fuze well. Once the forward part of the projectile is removed, the explosive
can be steamed out and the forward, fuzed portion burned in a portable demilitarization furnace. Once the explosive charge is removed, the metal is added to the
scrap to be sold. No fuzes containing primary explosives will be held and all will be
treated with heat or destroyed by detonation.
The key to this program will be well-trained, competent EOD and demilitarization personnel. They must be willing to submit to a stringent training and
quality-assurance/quality-control program and concentrate on safety at all times.
All the skills needed to make an EOD team effective can be taught or reinforced
by this program. Large areas of land can be cleared of the most dangerous items
in fairly short order by these teams. While the teams will do no subsurface clearance past shallow-buried bomblets or projectiles, the surface clearance will pay
big dividends.
Conclusion
Despite repeated warnings and dedicated MRE programs, casualties from
scrap-metal collection continue to increase. It seems warnings aren’t enough
and high-risk behaviors like collecting scrap metal must be addressed by either
technical or economic solutions. This proposed program combines these two
elements and helps address root economic issues through the application of new
technologies and incentives. The concept includes provisions for assisting scrap
dealers who currently traffic in dangerous munitions. The program may also
help eliminate the illegal collection and use of explosives for fishing or other illicit purposes. It certainly is not a total solution, but it may begin to reverse the
climbing rates of injuries and deaths resulting from the scrap-metal business.
Costs of this program could easily be offset by real reductions in the fiscal and
societal costs resulting from scrap-collection-related deaths and injuries. Golden
West will develop and implement this program when funding is secured.
See Endnotes, page 110

Finding More than Honey with Bees
Buried within the US$468 billion appropriations bill for the
U.S. Department of Defense’s fiscal 2007 budget is $5 million
for a new military tracking system—honey bees. The project
would train honey bees for a variety of military and commercial
uses, including finding landmines and other buried explosives.
Researchers at the University of Montana and Montana State
University claim the bees can be monitored via a laser-tracking
system. With further development, the bees may be able to detect
more than just landmines and buried explosives—researchers believe the bees may also be capable of finding methamphetamine
labs, dead bodies and other hard-to-detect items.
Still, the primary focus of the honey-bee experimentation is on
the discovery of explosives because bees are very attuned to
the scent of TNT and similar material. Recognizing the acute
sensitivity of bees’ antennae to different molecular compounds,
scientists have studied the bees’ reaction to the scent of food
and, through a Pavlovian technique, trained the bees to react
positively toward the scent of dangerous materials. Funding for
honey-bee programs is difficult to secure, and the technology
still is not in a marketable form.
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The Aftermath of War
The recent conflict between Hezbollah and
Israel resulted in many civilian victims
and though the fighting has ended,
the problems are nowhere near over for
the civilians of Lebanon whose country
is littered with cluster bomblets. This article

At Al Najda Hospital in Nabatiye, southern Lebanon, Sobhi Abbas, top, comforts his son
Abbas Abbas, 6 years old, who was injured while playing with a cluster bomb in Blida.
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explains the effects of the conflict on Lebanese civilians and describes how organizations are
trying to eradicate the cluster-submunitions problem and provide aid to affected civilians.
by Katie FitzGerald [ Mine Action Information Center ]

A

fter 34 days of fighting between Israel and the Hezbollah
militia in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 17011 on August 11, 2006,
which was aimed at ending hostilities, and a ceasefire entered
into force August 14. Despite only a month of fighting, the conflict greatly disrupted the normal lives of many Lebanese due to
the damage to their homes and fields, and the remaining unexploded ordnance—mainly cluster submunitions—that littered the ground. The
conflict killed over 1,500 people, many
of whom were Lebanese civilians, and displaced approximately 900,000 Lebanese and
300,000 Israelis. 2
The Victims
Many of the victims of this conflict were
civilians in Lebanon and Israel. As artillery
and missiles were fired by both Hezbollah
and Israel, approximately one-quarter of the
Israelis killed by Hezbollah and the majority
of the Lebanese killed by Israeli forces are reported to have been civilians.3
Little information is available on UXO in
Israel, but it is clear that the estimated 1,800
cluster bombs (containing over 1.2 million
cluster bomblets) fired into Lebanon have
devastated the local infrastructure.4 Along
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF MAIC
with houses and fields destroyed, hospitals,
schools, bridges, roads, factories, airports
and main seaports were also demolished. Particularly affected areas
were southern Lebanon, Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. The northern
part of Israel was most affected by Hezbollah attacks, which sometimes consisted of 150 rockets fired per day.5

It has been reported Israel used cluster munitions primarily delivered by artillery projectiles, followed by Multiple Launch Rocket
Systems and a lesser number of aerial cluster bombs.6 MLRS in particular are believed by many to be highly inaccurate.7 They are capable
of firing a high volume of mostly unguided munitions. The rockets
are designed to burst into submunitions at a planned altitude in order
to blanket the enemy army and personnel on the ground with smaller
explosive rounds. The cluster rounds that fail to
detonate—believed by the United Nations to be
up to 40 percent for some munitions fired by the
Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon—remain on
the ground as unexploded submunitions.4 In addition to the cluster submunitions, an estimated
15,300 items of unexploded ordnance—including
air-dropped bombs of 500 to 2,000 pounds (200
to 900 kilograms), ground- and naval-launched
artillery rounds and air-delivered rockets—now
litter the ground in southern Lebanon.8
In an August 30 Reuters AlertNet article,
Stephane Jaquenet, a United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees representative in
Lebanon, said the organization’s top priority
following the conflict was the safe return of the
approximately one million Lebanese who fled
the month-long war.11 Though U.N., Lebanese
Army and nongovernmental clearance teams immediately started removing bomblets and other
UXO, the United Nations and the government
of Lebanon have remained seriously concerned
about the danger residents could encounter.9 At the time of writing,
the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre of Southern
Lebanon assessed approximately 85 percent of southern Lebanon
for cluster-bomb strikes, and it is estimated that up to one million
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